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Abstract:   
A risk-averse firm faces uncertainty about the spot price of the output, but has access to 
a futures market. The technology requires both capital and labor to produce the output. 
Due to the presence of flexibility in production, the level of capital and the volume of 
futures contracts are chosen under uncertainty (i.e., prior to observing the realized spot 
price) whereas the level of labor is set under certainty (i.e., after observing the realized 
spot price). When there is flexibility in production, the optimal production decisions are 
different between a risk-neutral firm and a risk-averse firm, i.e., the separation result 
does not hold. Moreover, flexibility in production implies only partial hedging with an 
actuarially fair futures price, i.e., the full-hedging result does not hold. 
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1 Introduction
There are two central results for the optimal behavior of a risk-averse ﬁrm
facing a random price and having access to a futures market (Ethier, 1973;
Danthine, 1973; Holthausen, 1979; Feder et al., 1980). The ﬁrst result states
that production decisions are unrelated to both the distribution of the ran-
dom price and risk-aversion. This statement is known as the separation
result. The second result is called the full-hedging result, which states that,
under an actuarial fair futures price, the ﬁrm hedges by selling the entire
production in a futures market regardless of risk aversion. These results
do not hold in the presence of multiple sources of uncertainty such as basis
risk (Paroush and Wolf, 1992) or production risk (Anderson and Danthine,
1983).1
These issues are generally studied in the literature when all production-
related decisions of the ﬁrm are made under uncertainty, i.e., prior to observ-
ing the realization of the random price. In other words, there is no ﬂexibility
in production. However, in many industries, the ﬁrms are able to adjust pro-
duction upon acquiring new information about the spot price. While capital
inputs require long-term planning, labor inputs can be adjusted more rapidly
so as to modify the ﬁnal level of production. Yet, little is known in the liter-
ature regarding optimal behavior when the ﬁrms have access to the futures
market, but do not have to commit entirely to a certain level of production
prior to the realization of the random price. One exception is Moschini and
Harvey (1992). They study the eﬀect of ﬂexibility in production on optimal
production by comparing the benchmark case of certainty in which the spot
price is equal to the futures price with the case of uncertainty in which the
spot price is random. They show that in general optimal behavior diﬀer
between these two cases.
The purpose of this paper is to study how the presence of ﬂexibility in
production aﬀects the separation and full-hedging results. To that end, we
consider a technology that requires both capital and labor to produce the
1Recently, Dionne and Santugini (2013) showed that, under non-actuarially fair pricing
for the futures input market, the separation result does not hold when entry is considered
in an imperfectly competitive output market (without production ﬂexibility).
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output. The risk-averse ﬁrm faces uncertainty about the spot price of the
output, but has access to a futures market. Due to the presence of ﬂexibility
in production, the level of capital and the volume of futures contracts are
chosen under uncertainty (i.e., prior to observing the realized spot price)
whereas the level of labor is set under certainty (i.e., after observing the
realized spot price).
We present three results. First, we show that in the presence of ﬂexibility
in production, the optimal production decisions are diﬀerent between a risk-
neutral ﬁrm and a risk-averse ﬁrm.2 Second, we show that the presence
of ﬂexibility does not lead to full-hedging under an actuarial fair futures
price. In other words, the ﬁrm does not hedge expected production because
ﬂexibility in production adds a degree of freedom. Third, we consider a
speciﬁc parametric model with a Cobb-Douglas production function and a
symmetric binary distribution. In this parametric case, we show that as long
as there is some ﬂexibility in production, the ﬁrm hedges partially under
an actuarial fair futures price. Hence, hedging and ﬂexibility in production
are substitutes. This can explain the behavior of the gold mining industry
(Tufano, 1996). In this industry, the ﬁrms hedge their selling price for the
next three years by using diﬀerent contracts including forwards and futures.
It is well documented they hedge only a fraction of their production (the mean
of the industry is 25%) even when their payoﬀ is concave. This means that
they keep the ﬂexibility to adjust their production in function of future price
ﬂuctuations. In other words, we observe in this industry a trade-oﬀ between
price protection and production ﬂexibility which rejects full separation. Such
trade-oﬀ is also observed in the oil and gas industry.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the setup. Optimal
behavior without and with ﬂexibility in production is provided in Section 3.
Finally, Section 4 studies the eﬀect of ﬂexibility in production.
2Our result is diﬀerent from that of Moschini and Harvey (1992). They show that
optimal behavior under uncertainty depends on the distribution of the spot price and is
diﬀerent from optimal behavior under certainty when the spot price is equal to the futures
price. We consider another aspect of the separation result since we study the eﬀect of
risk-aversion on optimal behavior under uncertainty.
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2 Preliminaries
Consider a perfectly competitive ﬁrm producing a ﬁnal good using two kinds
of input. Speciﬁcally, l ≥ 0 units of labor and k ≥ 0 units of capital are
acquired to produce q ≥ 0 units of output. The technology to transform the
inputs into the output is deﬁned by q = ϕ(k, l) such that ϕ1, ϕ2, ϕ12 > 0 and
ϕ11, ϕ22 < 0. Total cost functions for labor and capital are cl(l) ≥ 0 and
ck(k) ≥ 0, respectively, such that c′l, c′k, c′′l , c′′k > 0.3
The ﬁrm sells h units of output on the futures market at price F , and
sells the remaining ϕ(k, l) − h units on the spot market at price S. Given
the ﬁrm’s decisions {k, l, h} and the prices {S, F}, the proﬁt function is
π(k, l, h;S, F ) = Sϕ(k, l)− cl(l)− ck(k) + (F − S)h. (1)
The ﬁrm is run by a manager who makes decisions so as to maximize
the (expected) utility of proﬁt. Speciﬁcally, the manager’s utility function
of proﬁts is u(π(k, l, h;S, F )) such that u′ > 0, u′′ ≤ 0.4 The manager
faces uncertainty about the spot price. Let S˜ be the random spot price
and E[S˜] be the expected spot price where E[·] is the expectation operator.5
Assumption 2.1 holds for the remainder of the paper.
Assumption 2.1. The futures price is actuarially fair, i.e., F = ES˜.
3 Optimal Behavior
Having described the set up, we now study the eﬀect of ﬂexibility in produc-
tion on the separation result and the full-hedging result. We begin with the
deﬁnition of ﬂexibility in production. We then recall the optimal behavior
for production and hedging when there is no ﬂexibility. We ﬁnally derive the
optimal behavior of the ﬁrm when there is ﬂexibility. In the next section, we
3The same analysis can be undertaken with constant unit cost of labor.
4Note that risk aversion is not necessary in our analysis, but the payoﬀ function must
be concave. Such concavity can be explained by market imperfection such as convex tax
functions or asymmetric information in the credit market (Tufano, 1996).
5A tilde distinguishes a random variable from a realization.
5
study the eﬀect of ﬂexibility in production on the separation and full-hedging
results.
Deﬁnition. Flexibility in production means that the ﬁrm is able to
alter production once the spot price is observed. Although the degree of
ﬂexibility varies across industries, capital-intensive industries (compared to
labor-intensive industries) are in general less able to adjust production. For
instance, the gold-mining industry require long-term planning in production,
which signiﬁcantly reduces ﬂexibility.
In our model, we assume that capital is chosen prior to observing the
spot price whereas labor is chosen after the spot price is known. To ﬁx ideas,
consider the Cobb-Douglas production function, i.e., ϕ(k, l) = k1−αlα, α ∈
[0, 1]. If α = 0, then production exhibits no ﬂexibility since only capital
matters. If α = 1, then there is full-ﬂexibility in production so that output
is essentially set under certainty, i.e., once the spot price is realized.6 When
α ∈ (0, 1), production exhibits a certain level of ﬂexibility, which increases
along with an increase in α.
Benchmark Model of No Flexibility in Production. In order to
study the eﬀect of ﬂexibility in production, we consider the benchmark case
of no ﬂexibility, as usually studied in the literature. To that end, consider
the case in which l = l > 0 is ﬁxed. There is no ﬂexibility in production
because output is essentially chosen prior to observing the spot price. In other
words, the ﬁrm commits to production (via the choice of capital) at the time
it chooses the volume of futures contracts. Hence, the ﬁrm’s maximization
problem is
max
k,h
E[u(S˜ϕ(k, l)− cl(l)− ck(k) + (F − S˜)h)]. (2)
It follows that the optimal level of capital k∗ satisﬁes
Fϕ1(k
∗, l) = c′k(k
∗) (3)
for both a risk-averse ﬁrm (i.e., u′′ < 0) and a risk-neutral ﬁrm (i.e., u′′ = 0).
6When there is full-ﬂexibility in production, the ﬁrm faces no risk. Hence, under an
actuarially fair futures price the ﬁrm has no desire to sell on the futures market.
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Moreover, the ﬁrm sells all production in the futures market, i.e., there is full
hedging,
h∗ = ϕ(k∗, l). (4)
Expressions (3) and (4) summarize the separation result and the full-hedging
result, respectively, when there is no ﬂexibility in production. See Ap-
pendix A for a proof.
General Model with Flexibility in Production. Having recalled the
separation and full-hedging results in the absence of ﬂexibility in production,
we now state the optimal behavior of the ﬁrm when there is ﬂexibility. The
maximization problem can be divided into two stages.7 In the ﬁrst stage,
the ﬁrm sets the volume of futures contracts h and acquires the stock of
capital k while facing uncertainty about the spot price of the output. In the
second stage, given the volume of futures contracts and the capital stock, the
ﬁrm observes the spot price of the output, and then chooses labor l so that
q = ϕ(k, l) units of output are produced. Hence, the ﬁrm does not commit
to a level of production before uncertainty is resolved, i.e., before the spot
price is realized.
We now solve the maximization problem beginning with the second stage.
In stage 2, given the ﬁrm’s decisions {k, h} and the spot price S,
l∗(k, S) = argmax
l>0
u(Sϕ(k, l)− cl(l)− ck(k) + (F − S)h) (5)
where all uncertainty has been resolved. The optimal level of labor is implic-
itly deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order condition
Sϕ2(k, l)− c′l(l) = 0 (6)
evaluated at l = l∗(k, S). In stage 1, given l∗(k, S)
{k∗, h∗} = arg max
k,h≥0
Eu(S˜ϕ(k, l∗(k, S˜))− cl(l∗(k, S˜))− ck(k)+(F − S˜)h). (7)
7See Le´autier and Rochet (2012) for a two-stage game in which each ﬁrm commits to
a hedging strategy in the ﬁrst stage and then chooses production or pricing strategies in
the second stage.
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Using the envelope theorem, the ﬁrst-order conditions are
k : E[(S˜ϕ1(k, l
∗(k, S˜))− c′k(k)) · u′(Π∗(k, h, S˜))] = 0 (8)
h : E[(F − S˜) · u′(Π∗(k, h, S˜))] = 0, (9)
Π∗(k, h, S˜) = S˜ϕ(k, l∗(k, S˜)) − cl(l∗(k, S˜)) − ck(k) + (F − S˜)h, evaluated at
k = k∗ and h = h∗.
4 Eﬀect of Flexibility in Production
Using (8) and (9), we study the eﬀect of ﬂexibility in production on the sep-
aration and full-hedging results. Proposition 4.1 states that in the presence
of ﬂexibility in production, the level of capital (and thus the level of output
conditional on S) is diﬀerent between a risk-neutral ﬁrm and a risk-averse
ﬁrm. In general, the production decision depends on risk-aversion.
Proposition 4.1. In general, ﬂexibility in production removes the separation
result, i.e., risk aversion has an eﬀect on the optimal level of capital and thus
on the level of production.
Proof. Consider ﬁrst a risk-neutral ﬁrm, i.e., u′′ = 0. Then, from (8), k∗ is
deﬁned by
E[S˜ϕ1(k, l
∗(k, S˜))]− c′(k) = 0. (10)
Consider next the case of a risk-averse ﬁrm, i.e., u′′ < 0. Suppose to the
contrary that k∗ for a risk-averse ﬁrm is also deﬁned by (10). Then, using (8),
it follows that
cov[S˜ϕ1(k, l
∗(k, S˜)), u′(Π∗(k, h, S˜))] = 0 (11)
where cov[·, ·] is the covariance operator. This cannot hold in general since
Sϕ1(k, l
∗(k, S)) is strictly increasing in S and u′(Π∗(k, h, S)) is not inde-
pendent of S. Hence, in general, a risk-averse ﬁrm does not behave like a
risk-neutral ﬁrm.
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Next, Proposition 4.2 states that an actuarially fair futures price does
not imply the full-hedging result. Recall from (4) that under no ﬂexibility in
production, output is equal to hedging, i.e., h∗ = q∗. When there is ﬂexibility
in production, such statement is not possible since output depends on the
observed spot price through the choice of labor. Hence, in that case, following
the literature of hedging under exogenous uncertain production (Losq, 1982),
the full-hedging result holds when the expected output is equal to the volume
of futures contracts. Let μq∗ ≡ Eϕ(k, l∗(k∗, S˜)) be the expected optimal level
of output.
Proposition 4.2. Suppose that the ﬁrm is risk-averse, i.e., u′′(π) < 0. Then,
ﬂexibility in production removes the full-hedging result, i.e., h∗ = μq∗.
Proof. Suppose to the contrary that h∗ = μq∗. Using Assumption 2.1, (9)
implies that
cov[S˜, u′(Π∗(k∗, μq∗, S˜))] = 0. (12)
This cannot hold in general since u′(Π∗(k∗, μq∗), S˜)), S) is not independent
of S.
In order to understand further the eﬀect of ﬂexibility on the full-hedging
result, we consider the parametric model with a Cobb-Douglas production
function, quadratic cost functions, and a symmetric binary distribution for
the spot price. Proposition 4.3 compares the optimal level of futures con-
tracts h∗ with the expected optimal level of output μq∗ ≡ Eϕ(k, l∗(k∗, S˜)).
The presence of ﬂexibility (i.e., α ∈ (0, 1)) implies partial hedging when the
futures price is actuarially fair. In addition, no ﬂexibility yields the standard
full-hedging result whereas full ﬂexibility (i.e., α = 1) implies that the ﬁrm
faces no risk and does not use the futures market.8
Proposition 4.3. Suppose that ϕ(k, l) = k1−αlα, α ∈ [0, 1], cl(l) = wl2/2,
ck(k) = rl
2/2, and for ε ∈ (0, F ), S˜ ∼ (1/2 ◦ (F − ε), 1/2 ◦ (F + ε)). Then,
for a risk-averse ﬁrm (i.e., i.e., u′′(π) < 0)
8In the case of full-ﬂexibility, output is nonrandom and the distribution of output is
degenerate at µq∗ .
9
1. For α = 0, h∗ = μq∗.
2. For α ∈ (0, 1), 0 < h∗ < μq∗.
3. For α = 1, 0 = h∗ < μq∗.
Proof. See Appendix B.
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A No Flexibility in Production
Since ϕ1(k, l) > 0 for all l > 0, let the inverse function of q = ϕ(k, l) be k =
ψ(q, l) so that (2) is rewritten as maxq,h E[u(S˜q−cl(l)−ck(ψ(q, l))+(F−S˜)h)].
The ﬁrst-order conditions are
q : E
[
(S˜ − c′k(ψ(q, l))ψ1(q, l)) · u′(Γ(q, h, l, S˜))
]
= 0, (13)
h : E
[
(F − S˜) · u′(Γ(q, h, l, S˜))
]
= 0. (14)
where Γ(q, h, l, S˜) = S˜q−cl(l)−ck(ψ(q, l))+(F−S˜)h. Summing (13) and (14)
yields (F − c′k(ψ(q, l))ψ1(q, l))E[u′(Γ(q, h, l, S˜))] = 0. Since u′ > 0, it follows
that, whether the ﬁrm is risk-neutral or risk-averse, the optimal level of
output satisﬁes F−c′(ψ(q, l))ψ1(q, l) = 0, which is equivalent to (3). Next, let
cov[·, ·] be the covariance operator. Given Assumption 2.1, (14) is equivalent
to cov[S˜, u′(Γ(q, h, l, S˜))] = 0, which is true when h∗ = q∗ = ϕ(k∗, l), as
stated in (4).
B Cobb-Douglas Production
In stage 2, given {k, h, S}, the ﬁrm’s maximization problem is
max
l>0
u(Sk1−αlα − wl2/2− rk2/2 + (F − S)h). (15)
Using (6), the optimal level of labor is
l∗(k, S) = α
1
2−αw−
1
2−αS
1
2−αk
1−α
2−α . (16)
Plugging (16) into ϕ(k, l∗(k, S)) = k1−α(l∗(k, S))α yields the stage-2 optimal
level of output as a function of the spot price,
ϕ(k, l∗(k, S)) = α
α
2−αw−
α
2−αk
2(1−α)
2−α S
α
2−α . (17)
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Plugging (17) into the proﬁt function yields stage-2 proﬁts as a function of
the spot price, i.e.,
Π∗(k, h, S) = S ·
(
α
1
2−αw−
1
2−αk
1−α
2−αS
1
2−α
)α
k1−α − wα 22−αw− 22−αk 2(1−α)2−α S 22−α
− rk2/2 + (F − S)h, (18)
= (1− α)α α2−αw −α2−αS 22−αk 2(1−α)2−α − rk2/2 + (F − S)h. (19)
At stage 1, the ﬁrm’s maximization problem is
max
k,h
Eu(Π∗(k, h, S)) (20)
where Π∗(k, h, S) is deﬁned by (19). Using the binary distribution for S˜, k∗
and h∗ are uniquely deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order conditions
k :
(
2(1− α)2α α2−αw −α2−α (F − ε) 22−α
2− α k
−α
2−α − rk
)
u′(Π∗(k, h, F − ε))
=
(
2(1− α)2α α2−αw −α2−α (F + ε) 22−α
2− α k
−α
2−α − rk
)
u′(Π∗(k, h, F + ε), (21)
and
h : u′(Π∗(k, h, F − ε)) = u′(Π∗(k, h, F + ε)). (22)
Since u′′ < 0, using (19) we solve (22) for h∗, i.e.,
h∗ =
(1− α)α α2−αw −α2−α
(
(F + ε)
2
2−α − (F − ε) 22−α
)
2ε
(k∗)
2(1−α)
2−α , (23)
where k∗ > 0 is deﬁned by the ﬁrst-order conditions.
Next, let μq∗ ≡ Eϕ(k, l∗(k∗, S˜)) be the expected optimal level of output.
Using (17),
μq∗ =
α
α
2−αw−
α
2−α
2
(
(F + ε)
α
2−α + (F − ε) α2−α
)
(k∗)
2(1−α)
2−α . (24)
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Hence, using (23) and (24),
μq∗ − h∗ =
⎛
⎝(F + ε) α2−α + (F − ε) α2−α − (1− α)
(
(F + ε)
2
2−α − (F − ε) 22−α
)
ε
⎞
⎠
· α
α
2−αw−
α
2−α
2
(k∗)
2(1−α)
2−α . (25)
Finally, it remains to sign expression (25). To that end, let y = F/ε such
that y ∈ (0, 1). From (25), it follows that μq∗ −h∗ > 0 if and only if g(y) > 0
where, for y ∈ (0, 1),
g(y) = (1 + y)
α
2−α + (1− y) α2−α − (1− α)(1 + y)
2
2−α − (1− y) 22−α
y
. (26)
To show that g(y) > 0, let
f(y) = (1 + y)
2
2−α − (1− y) 22−α (27)
so that
f ′(y) =
2
2− α
(
(1 + y)
α
2−α + (1− y) α2−α
)
> 0 (28)
and
f ′′(y) =
2
2− α
α
2− α
(
(1 + y)−
2(1−α)
2−α + (1− y)− 2(1−α)2−α
)
> 0. (29)
Using the mean-value theorem, and the fact that f ′(y), f ′′(y) > 0,
f(y)− f(0)
y
< f ′(y) (30)
or
(1 + y)
2
2−α − (1− y) 22−α
y
<
2
2− α((1 + y)
α
2−α + (1− y) α2−α ). (31)
Rearranging (31) yields
(1 + y)
α
2−α + (1− y) α2−α − (1− α/2)(1 + y)
2
2−α − (1− y) 22−α
y
> 0. (32)
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Since α ∈ (0, 1), combining (26) and (32) implies that, for y ∈ (0, 1),
g(y) > (1+y)
α
2−α +(1−y) α2−α − (1−α/2)(1 + y)
2
2−α − (1− y) 22−α
y
> 0. (33)
Hence, μq∗ − h∗ > 0 when α ∈ (0, 1). Using (25), μq∗ − h∗ = 0 when α = 0.
Using (23) and (24), 0 = h∗ < μq∗ when α = 1.
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